In the matter of Hajan v Mayor & Burgesses of the London Borough of Brent [2024] EWCA Civ 1260, heard between 9 and 10 October 2024, the court was required to determine when ‘proceedings’ were ‘begun’, in circumstances where the pleadings were amended to contain new grounds for possession. This decision may have wider applicability across other cases when unpleaded mandatory grounds materialise in matters initially brought on discretionary grounds for possession.

Facts:

On 12 March 2010, the London Borough of Brent (Brent) granted Mr Hajan a secured tenancy protected by the Housing Act 1985 (HA). In June 2022, Mr Hajan caused damage to Brent Civic Centre and threatened staff. Following this, Mr Hajan pleaded guilty on 5 August 2022 to an offence under Section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 (a serious offence and mandatory ground for possession per Paragraph 23, Schedule 2A HA). Harrow Crown Court sentenced Mr Hajan on 7 September 2022.

On 30 November 2022, Brent served a notice seeking possession pursuant to Section 83 HA on Ground 1 (rent arrears) and Ground 2 (anti-social behaviour) of Schedule 2 HA. Brent then issued proceedings on 21 December 2022.

However, upon receiving certification of Mr Hajan’s conviction, Brent served Mr Hajan on 4 May 2023 with a further notice seeking possession on mandatory grounds pursuant to Sections 83ZA and 84A HA, stating that court proceedings will not be brought until after 5 June 2023.

Further, Brent applied on 6 June 2023 to amend the Particulars of Claim to rely on the mandatory ground of a serious offence having been committed. This permission was granted by Deputy District Judge Samuel on 5 July 2023.

Mr Hajan applied for permission to appeal the above order, which His Honour Judge Luba KC granted. Lord Justice Andrews subsequently accepted a transfer of proceedings to the Court of Appeal to determine the appeal.

Issue:

The court may only make a possession order on Grounds 1 and 2 of Schedule 2 HA if it considers it reasonable. The court must make an order for possession if an absolute (mandatory) ground is made out in Schedule 2A HA.

Mr Hajan’s contention was that new ‘proceedings’ would have to be issued to rely on the further ground not already pleaded. This is because Section 83A (2) HA states that ‘the court shall not entertain proceedings for the possession of the dwelling-house unless they are begun after the date so specified and at a time when the notice is still in force.’ Additionally, the requirement in Section 83ZA (9) (a) HA states that the notice ‘must also specify the date after which proceedings for the possession of the dwelling-house may be begun, and (b) ceases to be in force 12 months after the date so specified.’

Brent argued that ‘proceedings’ ‘begun’ upon their application to amend the Particulars of Claim.

Judgment:

Lord Justice Lewison dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:

1. Notice under Section 83ZA HA had been given.
2. Mr Hajan’s interpretation was wasteful of costs and court time and contrary to the CPR policy of encouraging all issues to be decided within the same action.
3. A purposive approach to Sections 83ZA and 83A(2) HA was taken, in that if the court were to exercise its power to fix a date from which the amendment took effect, there would be no difficulty in interpreting the word ‘proceedings’ as referring to the amended proceedings, and as regarding those proceedings as having been ‘begun’ on the date when the amendment took effect.

The Court of Appeal, therefore, determined that amending proceedings could be construed as sufficient for the notice requirement, for when ‘proceedings’ were ‘begun’, without the necessity of issuing fresh proceedings. It will be interesting to see how this case can be applied to Section 8 of the Housing Act 1988 claims, where the grounds for possession evolve post-issue of proceedings.